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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann, §77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from
a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first
degree or capital felony.

In this case, the Honorable Raymond S.

Uno, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction against
Mr. Quintana for Burglary, a second degree felony, and Theft, a third
degree felony.

v

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Did the prosecutor's remarks in his opening statement

to the jury constitute misconduct and prejudice Mr. Quintana such
that his convictions should be reversed and a new trial ordered?

2.

Was the evidence sufficient to support the convictions

of Burglary and Theft?

3.

Did the trial court instruct the jury with an

erroneous instruction that had no factual basis in the evidence and
which relieved the State of its burden to prove each element beyond a
reasonable doubt such that Mr. Quintana was prejudiced thereby
requiring reversal of his convictions and a new trial ordered?

vi

TEXT OP STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution (in part)
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-202 (1953 as amended). Burglary
(1) A person is guilty of burglary is he enters
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion
of a building with intent to commit a felony or
theft or commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which
event it is a felony of the second degree.
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-402(1)(1953 as amended).
Presumptions and defenses.
The following presumption shall be applicable to
this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen,
when no satisfactory explanation of such possession
is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that
the person in possession stole the property.
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-404
Theft—Elements.
A person commits theft if
unauthorized control over
with a purpose to deprive

vii

(1953 as amended).
he obtains or exercises
the property of another
him thereof.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880406-CA
Priority No. 2

ANDREW R. QUINTANA,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and Theft, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended), following a
jury trial held May 24-25, 1988, in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 25, 1987, at approximately nine o'clock in
the morning, the Ted John family left their home at 1162 Emery
Avenue located in Salt Lake County for a short trip to southern Utah
(R. 118 at 27, 39). When the John family returned home on
September 27, 1987, somehwere around 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., they
found a note from the police attached to their door indicating that
their home had been burglarized.

The note indicated an

investigation had been started and requested that the Johns contact

the police (R. 118 at 29).
Mr. John inventoried the house for missing items and
reported that stereo equipment valued at approximately $800 was
missing (R. 118 at 31). Specifically, an amplifier, cassette player
and tuner (three component parts to the system) were absent together
with the connecting wires or "patch cords" (R. 118 at 31-32).

The

amplifier and the cassette components both measured fourteen inches
by six inches by ten inches, with the amplifier weighing ten to
fifteen pounds and the cassette player approximately four pounds
(R. 118 at 43). The tuner component measured fourteen inches by
three inches by ten inches and weighed approximately two pounds
(R. 118 at 43-44).

Mr. John later reported that a canister-type

vacuum cleaner was also missing (R. 118 at 31). The vacuum cleaner
was described as approximately three to four feet high and fourteen
to eighteen inches across (R. 118 at 44). The vacuum cleaner
together with the accompanying hose attachments was valued at
approximately $100 (R. 118 at 31).
Near the hour of 11:30 a.m. that Sunday morning, a
neighbor across the street from the John dwelling was returning home
from the grocery store (R. 118 at 57). This woman, Patricia Rains,
testified that as she arrived home, she observed a burgandy Mazda
pickup truck parked on the street and an individual standing on the
porch of her neighbor's home (R. 118 at 58-59).

Mrs. Rains watched

this individual for approximately five minutes, indicating that at
various times he knocked on the door, looked in the mail box, peeked
through the large picture window at the front of the house, and
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looked around (R. 118 at 59-60).

Mrs. Rains testified that she

thought he was stranded (R. 118 at 68).
Mrs. Rains testified at trial that this man was Andrew
Quintana (R. 118 at 61). She later clarified in her testimony that
she did not know Mr. Quintana but knew of him, and she admitted that
she had never met him (R. 118 at 61-62, 69-70).

Yet, Mrs. Rains

claimed to recognize him (R. 118 at 62, 68). She testified that at
the closest, as she pulled into her driveway, she was thirty feet
from the individual; other than that one point, she was no closer
than one hundred feet from him (R. 118 at 72, 79). She described
this man, in her mind Andrew Quintana, as approximately five feet,
six inches tall, wearing bright and colorful bermuda shorts along
with a tee shirt, the color of which she could not recall (R. 118 at
62).

After standing on the porch for several minutes, the

individual returned to his Mazda pickup truck and drove away.
Mrs. Rains' husband, Mr. Calvin Dean Rains, also
testified.

He described the person standing on the porch to have

been a Mexican male in his mid-twenties, approximately five feet
seven inches tall, with light to medium semi-wavey black hair
(R. 118 at 87). Mr. Rains also testified that the individual was
wearing multicolored bermuda shorts and a large tank top.

As had

his wife, Mr. Rains felt the individual on the porch of the John
home looked "suspicious1' (R. 118 at 87). Also, as had his wife,
Mr. Rains thought the person had left the area (R. 118 at 89).
Mr. Rains then testified that a couple of minutes later,
Mr. Rains went to his truck and headed back to the store for
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additional groceries (R. 118 at 90). As he pulled out of the
driveway and around the corner, he spotted the same vehicle parked
directly across from an alley way which ran behind the Johns1 home
(R. 118 at 91). Mr. Rains decided to stop and see what he could
observe.

He initially was unable to see the individual, but within

a few moments, he saw a person come out of the alley way (R. 118 at
92-93).

He testified that the man he saw come out of the alley way

was the same man that he saw on the porch (R. 118 at 93). He
testified that this man initially walked toward the Mazda pickup
truck, then spotted Mr. Rains in his vehicle and turned around
(R. 118 at 93). After several steps, he again turned around and
headed for the Mazda pickup truck (R. 118 at 93). Mr. Rains was
seventy-five to eighty yards away from the individual and testified
that it looked like this individual was carrying something under his
shirt (R. 118 at 94). He testified there was a large bulge on the
left-hand side and that the person was carrying his arm underneath
it (R. 118 at 94). This person walked directly to the vehicle,
which was some seventy-five yards away from Mr. Rains, and left the
area (R. 118 at 94). Mr. Rains then returned to his own home and
spoke with his wife.

Police officers were called and the crime

reported (R. 1L8 at 95-96).
Police Officer Chris Ahearn received a dispatch summoning
him to 1162 Emery Street on the 27th of September, 1987, at
11:54 a.m. (R. 118 at 46-47)

He spoke with Mr. and Mrs. Rains and

received descriptions of the vehicle and the individual.

The

description given was a male Hispanic, dark hair, five feet seven
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inches tall, approximately 130 pounds (R. 118 at 47). The vehicle
was described as a Mazda pickup, maroon in color with trim and a
damaged grill (R. 118 at 47). The license plate was reported as
5600AK (R. 118 at 50). Upon investigating the John residence,
Office Ahearn found that the back door to the home was open, there
was damage to a side window, and the screen was torn away (R. 118 at
47-48).

Inside the home, it appeared to him that several pieces of

stereo equipment were missing and drawers had been partially pulled
out of a dresser (R. 118 at 48). Officer Ahearn also testified that
it appeared that someone had walked through the weeds in the
backyard toward the alley because the weeds were partially trampled
(R. 118 at 49) .
Officer Ahearn's report was given to headquarters, which
then issued a dispatch for the suspect vehicle.

Later that same day

at approximately 3:00 p.m., Officer Robert Robinson of the Salt Lake
City Police Department spotted a 1983 Mazda, maroon and trimmed
pickup truck and pulled it over as a suspect vehicle in the burglary
(R. 119 at 4 ) . The license plate of that vehicle was 3600AK (not
5600AK as reported).

Officer Robinson indicated that the dispatch

also included a suspect described as a short male Hispanic adult in
his twenties, short black hair, wearing a tee shirt and shorts
(R. 119 at 5 ) . The driver of the vehicle pulled over by Officer
Robinson was Andrew Quintana (R. 119 at 5 ) . Officer Robinson
informed Mr. Quintana that he would impound the truck as a suspect
vehicle in a burglary (R. 119 at 8 ) . He did not, however, arrest
Mr. Quintana (R. 119 at 16). Officer Robinson noted at that time
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that Mr. Quintana was in a blue pullover shirt with grey
bermuda-type shorts (R. 119 at 9 ) . He also noted that on the
passenger seat in bhe cab of the pickup truck was wiring apparatus
which was eventually introduced at trial as Exhibit One and
identified as patch cords for a stereo system (R. 119 at 9 ) . The
police officer noted that this vehicle was stopped within three to
four blocks of Mr. Quintana's residence and approximately five to
six miles away from the burglary site (R. 119 at 11). Officer
Robinson clarified that the shorts were not multicolored but were in
fact grey, with no noticable variation in color (R. 119 at 14). He
also noted that the shirt was not a tank top and was without emblems
(R. 119 at 15). Officer Robinson further testified that
Mr. Quintana had indicated that he was with this truck around Noon
that afternoon helping his sister move a washer and dryer (R. 119 at
17).
At trial, Mr. Quintana's mother and sister testified.
His mother indicated that her son does not own multicolored shorts
(R. 119 at 26). Mr. Quintana's sister, Gerline, testified that
Mr. Quintana assisted her with moving a washer and dryer at
approximately 1:45 in the afternoon until a little after 2:00 p.m.
(R. 119 at 20). She testified she believed Mr. Quintana was wearing
grey shorts (R. 119 at 22).
Additionally, Andrew's brother, Jack Quintana, took the
stand, testifying that the truck in question was his and that there
was no damage to the front grill of his truck but rather no front
grill (R. 119 at 46). Jack Quintana further testified that the
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patch cords introduced by the prosecution as Exhibit One belonged to
the amplifier of his stereo system which he alternatively utilized
in both the home and the truck (R. 119 at 42). Jack Quintana also
testified that, as a matter of practice, he kept those patch cords
in the truck to be used with his amplifier (R. 119 at 41-42,
45-46).

His amplifier was also introduced into evidence to support

that testimony (R. 99).
Thomas J. Wennergren testified for the defense, noting
that in his stocking feet, Mr. Andrew Quintana is 5 f 3-1/2" tall
and, when wearing sneakers, 5' 4-3/4" tall (R. 119 at 49).
Prior to trial, Mr. Quintana filed a motion to suppress
the identification testimony of Mr. Rains because it was obtained
through suggestive police procedures (R. 24-28, 31-35).

Mr. Rains

was informed by police officers that they had a suspect in the
burglary crime and they brought Mr. Rains to the police station to
see if he could identify the individual they had in custody as the
man he had seen.

Mr. Quintana was then brought out by a police

officer and instructed to walk past Mr. Rains sitting at the desk.
Mr. Rains agreed he was the same man (R. 27-28).

The trial court

took the motion under advisement (R. 39) and later issued an order
granting the motion to suppress the witness identification (R. 40).
At trial, the prosecutor stated in his opening statements
to the jury that Mr. Rains "saw the defendant come out" from the
alley (R. 118 at 17). The statement drew an immediate objection
from defense counsel and a conference was held at the bench (R. 118
at 17). The prosecutor then continued his opening statement with
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similar statements to the jury (R. 118 at 17-18).

Defense counsel

asked that the Court hear argument on this objection before he
proceeded with his opening statement and the jury was excused to
accommodate that request (R. 118 at 19).
Counsel for Mr. Quintana then urged that the prosecutor's
remarks—that Mr. Rains saw the defendant coming out of the alley—
left an indelible impression in the jurors' minds that Mr. Rains
identified Mr. Quintana as the perpetrator of the crimes; counsel
insisted that the prosecutor's remark was in direct contradiction to
the Court's order and moved for a mistrial on that basis (R. 118 at
19-20).

After brief argument, the trial court denied the mistrial

motion (R. 118 at 21).
At the conclusion of the testimony, Mr. Quintana moved to
dismiss the case against him based on lack of evidence (R. 119 at
50-52).

The trial court denied that motion (R. 119 at 53).
Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, exceptions to

the jury instructions were made on the record after the jury had
retired to deliberate (R. 119 at 53, 104). Mr. Quintana objected to
Instruction No. 19 given by the Court, asserting the instruction was
contrary to the facts and an inaccurate statement of the law (R. 119
at 104-05).
After deliberating for less than two hours, the jury
returned with a verdict of guilty of the Burglary charge (R. 119 at
106) and this appeal followed.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The prosecutor's opening statement constituted misconduct
when, in direct contradiction to the trial court's order suppressing
a witness1 identification of Mr. Quintana, the prosecutor informed
the jurors that the witness in question saw Mr. Quintana, thereby
connecting in the minds of the jurors the identification evidence he
could not legally elicit from the witness.

The prosecutor's

misconduct prejudiced Mr. Quintana and requires reversal of his
convictions and a new trial ordered.
Insufficient evidence was presented to justify the
convictions for Burglary and Theft, requiring that Mr. Quintana's
convictions be reversed and the charges against him be dismissed.
Over the objection of counsel, the trial court gave an
instruction to the jury which was without a factual basis and which
relieved the State of its burden to prove each and every element of
the crimes charged against Mr. Quintana.

That instruction violated

Mr. Quintana's constitutional rights and he suffered prejudice
requiring that his convictions be reversed and a new trial ordered.

ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN THIS CASE
PREJUDICED MR. QUINTANA'S RIGHT TO A FUNDAMENTALLY
FAIR TRIAL AND REQUIRES REVERSAL OF HIS
CONVICTIONS.
Prior to trial, Mr. Quintana filed a motion to suppress
the identification testimony of Mr. Calvin Dean Rains (R. 24-28; see
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Addendum A ) .

Mr. Rains had been informed by police officers that a

suspect in the burglary/theft case was in custody, and Mr. Rains had
been brought down to the station to see if he could make a positive
identification (R. 24-28, 34-35).

Police sat Mr. Rains at a desk

and then walked Mr. Quintana past him; no other suspects were walked
in front of Mr. Rains (R. 26-28, 33-35).

Mr. Quintana urged that

the subsequent identification of him by Mr. Rains was obtained in an
unconstitutional manner and moved the Court to suppress that
identification testimony (R. 24-28).

The trial court took the

motion under advisement (R. 39) and later issued an order granting
the motion to suppress the witness1 identification of Mr. Quintana
(R. 40; see Addendum B ) . The order stated:
On motion of the defendant and good cause
appearing it is hereby ordered that the motion to
suppress witness identification is granted.
The Court finds that the identification
procedure used in this case was suggestive and the
State is prohibited from using the testimony of
Mr. Dean Rains at any subsequent proceedings to
identify Mr. Andrew Quintana (R. 40).
During his opening statement, the prosecutor told the
jury that Mr. Rains informed the police that the burglar was this
defendant, Andrew Quintana, and that Mr. and Mrs. Rains watched the
defendant on the porch of the John home until he left the area and
parked down at the end of the street (R. 118 at 15-16).

The

prosecutor explained that Mr. Rains was curious to know what was
happening because something was "not right" (R. 118 at 16). He
stated that Mr. Rains got into his car and drove to the corner near
the alleyway which ran behind the John home (R. 118 at 16-17).
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The

prosecutor explained that Mr. Rains parked next to that alley
(R. 118 at 17). The prosecutor then stated:
that the defendant was out of sight.

"And [Mr. Rains] said

[Mr. Rains] didn't know

exactly where the defendant had gone but essentially he said he saw
him come out [of the alley from behind the John home]" (R. 118 at
17).

Counsel for Mr. Quintana immediately objected and asked to

approach the bench; a sidebar conference was then held (R. 118 at
17).
Returning to his opening statment, the prosecutor
continued:
By the way, Mr. Rains, as I mentioned, is
sitting here in his vehicle, and he sees this man
come out in the area here on the diagram, which is
almost adjacent to where Ted John lives. And he
said that when the man came out, he appeared to be
wearing some kind of a baggy shirt, something like
a large T-shirt. Appeared there was something up
underneath that T-shirt. He said that initially
when he saw the suspect, he kind of hesitated for
a minute, almost as if he was going to turn and go
the other way. Then he turned around and came
back down the alleyway.
He walked right in front of Mr. Rains and
went over and got into something inside that 1983
Mazda pickup and took off.
Well, Mr. Rains went back to his wife,
told her to call the police, and then he went over
to Ted John's house and discovered that the back
door was opened and went in and appeared someone
had been in there, inside the house. He waited
and the police eventually arrived (R. 118 at
17-18; see complete opening statement of
prosecutor at Addendum C ) .
After the prosecutor concluded his opening statement,
counsel for Mr. Quintana requested that the jury be excused so that
he could make a motion before he delivered his opening statement
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(R. 118 at 19). The Court obliged and defense counsel then moved
for a mistrial (R. 118 at 19-21).

Counsel urged that the prosecutor

had just accomplished for Mr. Rains what the Court had ordered could
not be done, to wit:

planted in the minds of the jurors that

Mr. Rains saw Mr. Quintana coming out of that alleyway (R. 118 at
19-20; see Addendum D for mistrial motion, argument and ruling).
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, stating:
THE COURT: Based on what has been argued,
the Court is going to deny the motion. Court will
either make a curative instruction, but I believe
the Court has already told the jurors that the
only evidence that they are to consider is the
evidence that's heard form the witness stand. So
as the evidence comes out in arguments that are
made you will have to—that will have to be tied
in, and I don't think it can be tied in as far as
the evidence is concerned.
So the motion will be denied (R. 118 at
21) .
Mr. Quintana insists that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the motion for mistrial, and he maintains that
the prosecutor's remarks constitute misconduct and in and of
themselves require that Mr. Quintana's convictions be reversed and
the case remanded for a new trial.
Case lav/ espousing the duties and obligations of
prosecutors is legion.

Several such directives merit mentioning.

We have previously stated that the State
while charged with vigorously enforcing the laws
has a duty to not only secure appropriate
convictions, but an even higher duty to see that
justice is done. In his role as the State's
representative in criminal matters, the
prosecutor, therefore, must not only attempt to
win cases, but must see that justice is done.
Thus, while he should prosecute with earnestness
and vigor, it is as much his duty to refrain from
- 12 -

improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means
to bring about a just one.
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981) (quotations and
citations omitted).
The purpose of an opening statement is to
advise the jury of the facts relied upon and of
the questions and issues involved, which the jury
will have to determine, and to give them a general
picture of the facts and the situations, so that
they will be able to understand the evidence.
Counsel should outline generally what he intends
to prove, and should be .allowed considerable
latitude. He should make a fair statement of the
evidence and the extent to which he may go is
largely in the discretion of the trial court. He
should not make a statement of any facts which he
cannot legally prove upon the trial; nor should he
argue the merits of his case, or relate the
testimony at length.
State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285, 313 (Utah 1941) (citations omitted;
emphasis added); accord United States v. Signer, 482 F.2d 394,
398-99 (6th Cir. 1973), and cases cited therein.
[A prosecutor] may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor—indeed he should do so.
But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is . . . his duty
to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
In this case, the prosecutor violated the above tenets by
advancing in his opening statement the concept that his witness saw
Mr. Quintana in the alley behind the John residence emerging with a
bulge under his shirt—presumably of stolen goods.

The trial court

had ordered that Mr. Rains was prohibited from identifying
Mr. Quintana at any subsequent proceedings because the
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suggestiveness of the procedure used to obtain that identification
rendered it unreliable.

In advancing that the witness saw

Mr. Quintana, the prosecutor placed in the jurors' minds the
identification of Mr. Quintana by Mr. Rains in direct contravention
of the Court's order.

The prosecutor stated as fact something he

knew he could not legally establish at trial.
Because the statement violated the court order, the
prosecutor cannot claim the error was made either unintentionally or
somehow in good faith.

An examination of United States v. Johnson,

767 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1985), dispells this remote possibility.

In

Johnson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals instructed that
prosecutor misconduct "made during an opening statement makes it
more egregious than a similar remark would be during closing
argument."

Ij3. at 1274.

The Court clarified that certain

improprieties during closing arguments can be excused as a product
of provocation but that an opening statement does not occur in such
a charged atmosphere and is usually presumed to be carefully
planned.

Id.
Nor can this Court permit the misconduct to stand because

the opening statements of counsel are not evidence—as urged by the
prosecutor and adapted by the trial court as basis to deny the
mistrial motion.

Rather, the Utah Supreme Court, in a case where

improper remarks of the prosecutor during opening statements were
found to be reversible error, State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah
1984), reiterated the standard governing reversals for improper
statements of the prosecutor.

The Court stated:
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The test of whether the remarks made by counsel
are so objectionable as to merit reversal in a
criminal case is, [1] did the remarks call to the
attention of the jurors matters which they would
not be justified in considering in determining
their verdict, and [2] were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case, probably
influenced by those remarks.
Id. at 486 (citing inter alia State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426
(Utah 1973).
Applying this test to Mr. Quintana'a case demonstrates
the prosecutor's misconduct merits reversal.

The first prong of the

test is met because the prosecutor's statement called to the
attention of the jurors a fact which had been suppressed by the
trial court and ordered inadmissible because of the violation of
Mr. Quintana's constitutional rights to due process and a fair
trial.

The prosecutor's statement disclosed to the jurors that,

contrary to the court order barring the information, Mr. Rains
identified Mr. Quintana as the man in the alley behind the John home
with a bulge under his shirt.

The jurors were not entitled to hear

that information.
The second prong—whether the jurors were influenced by
that information—is equally clear.

Because this case was conceded

by all to have been an identification case (R. 83-86; R. 118 at
19-21), the statement that Mr. Rains saw Mr. Quintana in the alley
behind the John residence with a bulge under his shirt provided the
jurors with an inference that the bulge might have been missing
property which might have come from the John home.

This information

"probably influenced the jurors" because no other information came
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as close to placing Mr. Quintana in the home, to establish the
burglary, or in possession of property belonging to the John family,
to establish the theft.
Inasmuch as the standard governing reversals for improper
statements of the prosecutor has been met, Mr. Quintana urges this
Court to find the remarks of the prosecutor in this case to merit
reversal of his convictions for Burglary and Theft and for this
Court to remand his case for a new trial.

POINT II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTIONS OF
MR. QUINTANA.
Mr. Quintana maintains that the evidence adduced at trial
is unable to support the convictions of Burglary and Theft.

He

requests this Court to examine the sufficiency of the evidence,
reverse his convictions, and remand his case to the trial court with
an order dismissing the charges against him.

In State v. Petree,

659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court stated, "[N]ot
withstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision, this
court still has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the verdict."

Further, the Court noted:

We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime for
which he was convicted.
Id.

This standard restates the due process requirement which

prohibits a criminal conviction in any case except upon proof beyond
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a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which the defendant is charged.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307 (1979); In re Winshipy 397 U.S. 258 (1970).
Mr. Quintana denied committing the Burglary and Theft
charges filed against him, thereby requiring the State to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of those crimes.
Mr. Quintana insists that the State did not meet that burden.

The

State must necessarily have shown that Mr. Quintana committed the
following acts:
76-6-202. Burglary—(1) A person is guilty of
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of the building with intent
to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on
any person.
76-6-404. Theft—Elements—A person commits theft
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with the purpose to
deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. §§76-6-202, 76-6-404 (1953 as amended).

Several key

problems exist with the State's case in establishing the elements of
the above two crimes.

While evidence existed to support that a

burglary occurred at the John home and that a theft of property from
within the home occurred, insufficient evidence existed as to the
identification of the perpetrator of those crimes.
The critical issue in this case was indisputably one of
identification.

Even the prosecutor repeatedly conceded that the

ultimate issue in the case was whether Mr. Quintana was the culprit
(R. 118 at 20, R. 119 at 73). Despite that concession, the State
was unable to produce a sufficient quantum of evidence to identify
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Mr. Quintana as the individual who committed the burglary.

Aside

from no competent identification testimony, the State failed to
connect Mr. Quintana with any of the Johns1 stolen property.
The Johns left their home on early Friday morning and did
not return until somewhere between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. Sunday,
September 27, 1987.

While they found property missing from their

home, the Johns themselves had no idea of the timing of the burglary
and theft.

The evidence admitted at trial on this issue consisted

of testimonial evidence from neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Rains, who
observed an individual on the porch of the John home late Sunday
morning.

Later, Mr. Rains spotted a person whom he believed to be

the same individual in an alley behind the John home.

No testimony

was introduced that the individual spotted on the porch or in the
alley was actually in the home of Mr. and Mrs. John nor that he was
actually observed taking the property of the Johns.
While it is true that Mr. Rains testified that the man he
saw in the alley behind the John home appeared to be carrying
something under his arm (R. 118 at 94), it is inconceivable that the
bulge he described could have been the property taken from the John
home inasmuch as a large vacuum and hose attachments and three
good-sized stereo components would have created much more than a
bulge.1

Moreover, it is important to note that the time which

1 The actual size of the property missing from the John
residence was described as follows: Amplifier, 14 x 6 x 10 inches,
weighing 10 to 15 pounds; cassette player, 14 x 6 x 10 inches, 4
pounds; the tuner, 14 x 3 x 10 inches, 2 pounds in weight; and the
vacuum with accompanying hose attachments, approximately 3 to 4 feet
high and 14 to 18 inches across, no testimony was given as to the
weight of the vacuum cleaner (R. 118 at 31, 43-44).
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elapsed from Mr. Rains observing the individual leave the porch of
the John home until he spotted that vehicle near the alley behind
the John home was mere minutes (R. 118 at 90) discounting the
prosecutor's speculation of multiple trips or hiding the evidence
(R. 119 at 102-03).
The most critical evidence introduced at trial against
Mr. Quintana was the testimony of Patricia Rains, who testified that
as she arrived home, she observed a burgandy Mazda pickup truck and
an individual standing on the porch of her neighbors1 home.

She

later testified that she recognized that individual to be Andrew
Quintana (R. 118 at 61). This identification complete with the name
was inherently unreliable and unsubstantiated by her own testimony.
First, Mrs. Rains' physical description of the individual is
inconsistent with Mr. Quintana himself.

She described the

individual as being five feet six inches tall and weighing bright
and colorful bermuda shorts along with a tee shirt, the color of
which she could not recall (R. 118 at 62). Mr. Quintana was
measured by Thomas J. Wennergren, who testified that Mr. Quintana is
5' 3-1/2" and, when wearing sneakers, 5f 4-3/4" tall (R. 119 t 49).
Also, when stopped by police hours later, Mr. Quintana was not
wearing colorful shorts but a solid grey pair (R. 119 at 9, 14).
Moreover, his mother testified that he did not even own a pair of
shorts such as those described by Mrs. Rains (R. 119 at 26).
Second, contrary to her identifying Mr. Quintana by name,
Mrs. Rains was unable to indicate how she knew Mr. Quintana, nor
could she explain how she recognized him on the porch of the John
- 19 -

home.
69-70).

She admitted she had never met Mr. Quintana (R. 118 at 61-62,
Further, she claimed that, at the closest, she was thirty

feet from the individual for mere seconds while she turned into the
driveway and, after that, she was no closer than one hundred feet
away from him (R. 118 at 72, 79), a distance quite lacking for
identifying a person one had never actually met before.

See

Addendum E for transcript reflecting the lack of credible basis for
recognizing Mr. Quintana.
Third, and also critical is the lack of substantiation by
police officers that Mrs. Rains actually identified the perpetrator
as Mr. Quintana.

She testified that when she notified police that a

burglary had occurred, she gave the officers the license plate of
the Mazda pickup truck, its description, and the name of Andy
Quintana as the culprit (R. 118 at 65). However, police officers
Ahearn and Robinson involved in the case were unable to corroborate
that testimony inasmuch as neither officer had the information on
reports or from dispatch that the suspect had been identified by
name (R. 118 at 47; R. 119 at 5, 13). The dispatch indicated
nothing more than the suspect vehicle being a Mazda pickup truck,
maroon in color with trim and a damaged grill, and with a license
plate reported as 5600AK.

In direct disagreement with Mrs. Rains1

testimony was the fact that Officer Robinson, when he pulled over
the suspect vehicle, found Mr. Andrew Quintana as the driver and did
not arrest him (R. 119 at 16). Had the name of the suspect been
given to police, it is beyond question that the name would have been
part of the dispatch and, that having been part of the
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dispatch, that Mr. Quintana would have been arrested as the suspect
in conjunction with the impound of the suspect vehicle.

It follows

that Mrs. Rains1 testimony is inconsistent with the evidence
presented at trial and inherently unreliable.
Fourth, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized various
evils inherent in eyewitness identification which requires rejecting
as unreliable the testimony of Mrs. Rains.

In State v. Long, 721

P.2d 483, 489-91 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court outlined
numerous problems, both potential and real, with the human memory
process and with the ability of witnesses to accurately recall
events.

The Supreme Court pointed out that:
(r)esearch has also undermined the common notion
that the confidence with which an individual makes
an identification is a valid indicator of the
accuracy of the recollection. In fact, the
accuracy of an identification is at times inversely
related to the confidence with which it is made.

721 P.2d at 490 (citations omitted).

This recognition by the

Supreme Court directly applies to the testimony of Mrs. Rains.

The

certainly of her identification of Mr. Quintana is contrary to the
majority of the indicators analyzed by the Court in State v. Long.
Moreover, it was late in the case when she "recalled" identifying
Mr. Quintana by name on the day of the crimes.

Therefore, not

beyond consideration in this case is the possible explanation that
Mrs. Rains1 late assertions at trial that she originally identified
the perpetrator as Mr. Andy Quintana may be in direct response to
the inability of her husband, Mr. Rains, to take the stand and offer
identification testimony due to the suggestive nature of the
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procedures police officers employed to obtain that testimony (see
Point I, supra).
Mrs.

Rains' identification testimony, when checked

against the Supreme Court's opinion recognizing the inherent
problems in eyewitness testimony, is suspect and should have been
discounted by the jury and, on review, must be discredited by this
Court.

As the Supreme Court found in State v. Long, empirical

evidence documents the unreliability of eyewitness testimony with
countless studies "all lead[ing] inexoribly to the conclusion that
human perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited
and fallable."

Ij3. at 488.

An additional observation by the Utah

Supreme Court allows this Court to devalue the testimony of
Mrs. Rains where the jurors did not.

The Court indicated:

[P]erhaps it is precisely because jurors do not
appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness testimony
that they give such testimony great weight. In one
notable study involving a simulated trial, 18% of
the jurors voted to convict the defendant when
there were no eyewitnesses to the crime. However,
when a credible eyewitness was presented, 72% voted
to convict. And, surprisingly, even when presented
with an eyewitness who was quite thoroughly
discredited by counsel, a full 68% still voted to
convict.
Id. at 490 (citations omitted).

Understanding the suspect nature of

Mrs. Rains' testimony and the inherent problems of eyewitness
testimony, this Court must recognize that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that Mr. Quitana was correctly
identified as the perpetrator of the burglary and theft crimes of
the Johns' home and property.
Accordingly, the above factors illustrate that this Court
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should recognize as a matter of law that the identification
testimony of Mrs. Rains is unable and insufficient to sustain the
convictions of Mr. Quintana.

This Court should therefore reverse

those convictions for insufficiency of the evidence and remand the
case with an order to dismiss the charges against him.
The additional piece of damaging evidence introduced
against Mr. Quintana was the testimony regarding the patch cords
found in the front of the Mazda pickup truck when stopped by Police
Officer Robinson (R. 119 at 9 ) . The prosecution offered those patch
cords as Exhibit #1, implying them to be the actual patch cords
taken from the home of Mr. John (R. 119 at 10). However, that
assertion was incorrect as Mr. John was unable to identify the patch
cords as his own (R. 118 at 33). See Point IIIA, infra.

Not only

was Mr. John not able to identify the patch cords as his own,
Mr. Quintana introduced testimony which indicated those patch cords
belonged to his brother, Jack, for use in the pickup truck and that
they routinely remained in the pickup truck (R. 119 at 41, 45). The
testimony of Jack was wholly corroborated by his mother (R. 119 at
38) .
Inasmuch as the patch cords were the only evidence which
implicated Mr. Quintana and which could have established the
requisite elements of the crime of Theft, thereby supporting the
crime of Burglary, the State's case is insufficient as a matter of
law.

Again, this Court should therefore reverse the convictions of

Mr. Quintana and remand to the trial court for a dismissal of the
charges against him.
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN SUBMITTING INSTRUCTION NO. 19 TO THE JURY
OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF MR. QUINTANA.
The trial court, over the objections of counsel,
instructed the jury in this case as follows:
Possession of recently stolen property, if
not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a
circumstance from which you may reasonably draw
the inference and find, in light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence of
the case, that the person in possession knew the
property had been stolen.
Thus if you find from the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was
in possession of stolen property, that such
possession was not too remote in point of time
from the theft, and the defendant made no
satisfactory explanation of such possession, then
you may infer from those facts that the defendant
committed the theft.
You may use the same inference, if you
find it justified by the evidence, to connect the
possessor of recently stolen property with the
offense of burglary (R. 82).
Mr. Quintana objected to the instruction on two grounds:

(1) No

factual basis existed to support the conclusion that stolen property
had been found in Mr. Quintana's possession, and (2) the instruction
violated constitutional rights and inaccurately stated the law
(R. 119 at 104-05).

Mr. Quintana now urges that instruction No. 19

not only was without factual basis but also violated his federal and
state due process rights by effectively relieving the prosecution of
its burden to prove each element of the offenses charged against him.
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A.

NO FACTUAL BASIS EXISTED FOR THE INSTRUCTION.

The State alleged that Mr. Quintana was responsible for
the burglary of the John home and the theft of three stereo
components and accompanying "patch cords" as well as a vacuum
cleaner and hose attachments (R. 118 at 31-32).

While evidence was

introduced at trial that these items were missing from the John
home, no evidence suggested that Mr. Quintana was at any point in
possession of the property.
The closest allegation of possession of stolen property
was presented through Exhibit #1, patch cords found in the truck of
Mr. Quintana's brother, Jack (R. 118 at 31-32).

However, those

patch cords were never identified as the missing patch cords and
were actually owned by Mr. Quintana's brother, Jack (R. 118 at 33;
R. 119 at 41) .
Mr. Ted John was shown the patch cords marked as
Exhibit #1.

The following colloquy took place:

Q Let me show you—let me show you what
has been marked here as Exhibit No. 1. Do you
recognize these at all?
A These look like the patch cords from
the stereo.
Q

Would you describe those as being patch

A

Yes.

cords?

Q And would they be similar to the ones
that you had in your stereo system?
A

Yes, very similar (R. 118 at 33).
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On cross-examination, Mr. John further testified that the patch
cords were the same that one would find on all stereo components
(R. 118 at 41). He further agreed that while the patch cords
indicated they were made in Japan, a good portion of stereo
equipment is made there these days (R. 118 at 41). In short,
Mr. John did not identify the patch cords as being his.
Jack Quintana, Appellant's brother, testified that the
Exhibit #1 patch cords which were taken from his truck belonged to
him (R. 119 at 41) and that he routinely kept them in his truck to
connect his portable amplifier, which he would alternate between his
home and the truck (R. 119 at 41). His amplifier was introduced
into evidence to support the testimony (R. 99; R. 119 at 41).
Mrs. Beulah Gonzales, Mr. Quintanafs mother, corroborated the
testimony of Jack, indicating she had seen the amplifier in the
house and in the truck and that a corresponding set of patch cords
were at home for the amplifier's use in the house (R. 119 at 38).
Accordingly, the State did not establish that the patch
cords were stolen; the only testimony regarding ownership was
introduced by Jack Quintana and his mother.
unrebutted.

That testimony was

As no stolen property was found in Mr. Andrew

Quintana's possession, the instruction was without basis and should
not have been given to the jury.

The fact that the instruction was

given without a factual basis cannot be construed as anything less
than a baseless implication that stolen property was found on
Mr. Quintana and should be considered in establishing his guilt of
the crimes charged against him.

As this Court recognized in
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State v, Howland, 761 P.2d 579 (Utah App. 1988), instructions must
be based on the evidence.

This Court reaffirmed that maxim in

Howland, stating:
It seems almost axiomatic that instructions must
bear a relationship to evidence reflected in the
record, and we cannot enjoy the luxury of
sustaining a conviction on trite aphorism
unsupported by any kind of evidence,
^
Id. at 580 (quoting State v. Pacheco, 495 P.2d 808, 808 (1972)).
This Court found the offending instruction in Howland to be
reversible error.

1^.

at 581.

As Instruction No. 19 also offends

this principle, Mr. Quintana was likewise prejudiced when the court
gave the baseless instruction, and a new trial should be granted
wherein such error does not reoccur.
In the event this Court believes a factual basis existed
to support the giving of the instruction, the instruction misapplied
the law and violated Mr. Quintana's federal and state due process
rights.

B. THE INSTRUCTION VIOLATED FEDERAL AND STATE DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS.
Instruction No. 19 required that Mr. Quintana offer a
satisfactory explanation for the possession of stolen property or
otherwise suffer the inferences that he knew the property was
stolen, that he stole it, and that he burglarized in order to steal
it.

Such possible presumptions have no place in the law and

impermissibly absolve the State from the obligation of proving each
element of burglary and theft as constitutionally required.

- 27 -

Both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have examined
this question involving an instruction using similar language.

In

State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 326-27 (Utah 1985); State v.
Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1986); and State v. Turner, 736
P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Courts have held that the
following instruction violated due process:
Possession of property recently stolen, when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is
made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that
the person in possession stole the property.
In each case, the Court found that this mandatory rebuttable
presumption directly relates to the issue of guilt and relieves the
State of its burden of proof.

State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d at 327;

State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d at 194; State v. Turner, 736 P.2d at 1045.
The opinions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court
relied on Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), and Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), wherein the United States Supreme
Court reminded that the due process clause requires "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt oE every fact necessary to constitute the
crime . . . charged" (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
The Sandstrom Court stated the appropriate standard as "whether the
challenged jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State of
the burden of proof enunciated in Winship," reasoning that if the
jury could interpret the instruction as an irrebutable presumption
or as requiring a high level of proof which effectively shifts the
burden of persuasion to the defendant, it cannot pass constitutional
muster.

422 U.S. at 517.
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Admittedly, the instruction at issue in Chambers,
Pacheco, and Turner contains mandatory language whereas Instruction
No. 19 in this case used more permissive terms.
No. 19, supra, or at Addendum F).

(See Instruction

That distinction, however, is of

no significance to the outcome of this issue when applied to this
case.

In all three Utah cases relied on herein, the Courts have

ruled that the statutory language of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1)
(1953 as amended), which spawned this instruction, is not to be used
in any form in instructing juries in criminal cases.

Chambers, 709

P.2d at 327; Pacheco, 712 P.2d at 194; Turner, 736 P.2d at 1045.
The form used in Instruction No. 19 permitted Mr. Quintana's jury to
reduce if not absolve the State of its burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt each element of the offenses and shifted that
burden, requiring Mr. Quintana to produce satisfactory explanations
of his alleged possession of the property.
In State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court addressed the question raised here in the context of a
similar instruction without a mandatory presumption.

The Court

found no error where the instruction only allowed an inference of
guilt and only if justified from the facts.

.id. at 1234. However

State v. Smith is distinguishable from the case at bar because the
Smith Court reached that decision relying on several other
instructions which accompanied the challenged instruction and
clarified and reiterated that the inference was permissible only if
supported by the facts.

Further, still other instructions informed

and cautioned jurors that mere possession of stolen property in and
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of itself is not sufficient to justify a verdict of guilty.
1235 & 1235 n.l.

J[d. at

The Court found these accompanying instructions

prevented the jurors from applying the challenged instruction in an
unconstitutional manner. JEd. at 1235.
The jury in Mr. Quintanafs case did not receive the
benefit of such rehabilitating companion instructions and did likely
utilize Instruction No. 19 in an unconstitutionally impermissible
manner.

Moreover, the Smith Court completed its discussion of this

issue "emphatically" declaring that Smith was not to be construed as
a retreat from Chambers and that the trial court "should not have
used" the language from Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) for the same
reasons stated in Chambers.

Id. at 1235-36.

Therefore, Smith is

inapposite to the determination to be made in this case.
Mr. Quintana's case is more closely alligned with the
opinion in State v. Turner, 736 P.2d at 1046, wherein this Court
found that the shift in burden occurring in that case was reversible
error in light of the "slim evidentiary basis" for the conviction.
The case against Mr. Quintana is at least as questionable, as
Mr. Turner possessed stolen property and Mr. Quintana arguably did
not (see subpoint A of this point, supra) and because the State in
both cases did not produce any evidence that the accused stole
anything and relied on minimal pieces of circumstantial evidence to
support the cases.

Compare State v. Turner, 736 P.2d at 1046, with

Point II of this brief, supra.
Although the Utah tripartite of cases cited herein,
Chambers, Pacheco and Turner, ostensibly relied on the federal due
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process protections afforded through the fourteenth amendment,
Mr. Quintana insists that Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution also supports his position and requires reversal of his
conviction and a new trial,

Mr. Quintana urges that Utah's due

process protection affords him at least the equivalent of the
federal safeguards discussed above and may surpass the federal
protection.

See State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985)

(Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah
1986); and "Recent Developments in Utah Law," 1987 Utah Law Review
79.

See also State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) (due

process of state constitution protects against the refiling of
criminal charges absent a showing of new or additional evidence or
other good cause), and State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)
(state due process may be violated without a cautionary instruction
revealing the unreliability of eyewitness testimony whenever
eyewitness testimony is at issue and the instruction is requested by
the defense) .
In the present case, the jurors were allowed to relieve
the State of its burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt and were allowed to shift that burden to
Mr. Quintana to satisfactorily explain the circumstances.

The

instruction permitting that opportunity violated federal and/or
state constitutional due process strictures and cannot be
tolerated.

Mr. Quintana must have the ability to remain silent if

he so chooses, as he did in this case, and to require the State to
prove its case against him.

See State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043,

- 31 -

1045 (Utah App, 1987) (Instruction No. 19 could have been viewed by
the jury as an unfavorable comment on his silence and exercise of
his constitutional right to a jury trial).

As that burden was

removed from the State in this case, Mr. Quintana's convictions must
be reversed an3 the case remanded for a new trial absent such error.

CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant
respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and
remand this case to the District Court with an order to dismiss the
charges or hol<3 a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this ^g^

day of March, 1989.

-f^ZL^*
UD&Y

ley for

Defendkrtt/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
If RICHARD G. UDAY, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol

J
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this J ^

- 32 -

day of March, 1989.

DELIVERED by
this

day of March, 1989.

- 33

ADDENDUM A

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah
LYNN R. BROWN (#0460)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

. MAR 1T1988
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\geputy CJe**

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

:
:

vs.

:

ANDREW R. QUINTANA,

:

Defendant

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
WITNESS IDENTIFICATION

Case No. CR87-1424
Judge RAYMOND S. UNO

:

The defendant above named by and through his attorney,
LYNN R. BROWN, hereby moves the court for an order suppressing
the identification of the defendant, ANDREW R. QUINTANA, by
Dean Rains, a witness in the case.
The basis for this motion is that a witness in the
case, Mr. Dean Rains, was told by the police that they had a
suspect who they thought might be involved in the burglary.
The defendant, Mr. Quintana, was then identified while at the
police station by having him walk past a desk where the
witness, Mr. Rains, was sitting.

The identification of the defendant, Mr. Andrew
Quintana, in the manner described above was made contrary to
acceptable standards of due process in that such identification
procedure was suggestive and proper identification procedures
were not followed.
DATED this f {

day of March, 1988.
Respectfully submitted,

Cfr~*

X<

\ ^4r~

EYflN R. BROWN
Ktt
ttorney for Defendant

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on
the

1/ day of *rn^<r/i

/ 1988, at the hour of <L fi .m •

before the Honorable RAYMOND S. UNO, Third District Court
Judge.

Please govern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this

//

day of March, 1988.

/

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion and Notice of
Hearing to the Salt Lake County Attorney1s Office, 231 East
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
March, 1988.

day of

A:

No I was not.

Q:

So the first time that you had occasion to identify any body is

in court here today, is that correct?
A:

No, they, the police department had me come in and they had him

in an office and asked me to identify him.
Q:

Where was this at?

A:

At the police department on the eight floor.

Q:

They took you into the police department and showed you him

sitting in an office.
A:

No, they just had him walk by me as I sat at a desk.

Q:

How close did he walk by you?

A:

Ifd say about four feet.

Q:

What did they tell you, that they had a person that they thought

might be involved* in the burglary and that they want you to take a
look at him?
A:

Yes.

Q:

And so they brought you down to the police station.

A:

Yes.

Q:

And had him walk by you.

A:

Exactly.

Q:

Did anyone else walk by you?

A:

Just another officer at the time.

Q:

They didnft have any other suspects to walk by you though to

take a look at then, is that true?
A:

No.

Q:

Just one individual?

A:

Yes.

- 18 -

Q:

And that's the individual seated at counsel table here.

A:

Yes.

Q:

And the same individual that walked by you then is seated here,

is that true?
A:

Yes.

Q:

So then you told them at that time that that was the individual

that was involved in what you saw on that particular day?
A?

Yes.

Q:

Was there any difference in the way he looked then and the way

he looked on that particular day?
A:

Then being when I was there at the police department?

Q:

Yes.

A:

Uh, other then the cloths, no.

Q:

So at the police station and today is the only time you've had

to making identification, is that correct?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Now when the individual went to the front porch, he was only

there a matter of a few seconds, is that correct?
A:

Yes.

Q:

And he didn't open the door, is that true?

A:

No.

Q:

Did you see him attempt to open any door?

A:

Oh, actually no, it looked more like he might have rang the door

bell is what it looked like he was doing.
Q:

•

A:

I couldn't exactly tell, his back was to me at the time.

Q:

Did he go to any of the windows?

- 19 -

ADDENDUM B

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

.APR 2 5 1988

LYNN R. BROWN (#0460)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

/

H> 0^09 MmdltyC Cterlc 3r<S Ofst. Coprt
I

\Oeputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO SUPPRESS WITNESS
IDENTIFICATION

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
vs.

Case No. CR87-1424
Judge RAYMOND S. UNO

ANDREW R. QUINTANA,
Defendant

On motion of the defendant and good cause appearing it
is hereby ordered that the motion to suppress witness
identification is granted.
The Court finds that the identification procedure used
in this case was suggestive and the State is prohibited from
using the testimony of Mr. Dean Rains at any subsequent
proceedings to identify Mr. Andrew Quintana.
DATED this ^ T ^ d a y of April, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

0
JUDGE RAYMOND S . UNO

Third D i s t r i c t rt^ptxrtcy;/-X

If

D:X£H ; I .

<~V£Y

ADDENDUM C

direct examination, State will cross-examine.

After they

have rested, the State may have some rebuttal witnesses, and
the defense may have some surrebuttal witnesses.
After both sides have rested, then the Court will
read the instructions to you.

After the instructions are

read, then they both have an opportunity to make a closing
statement to you.

Since the State has the burden of proof,

they will make the first opening statement.

Then the de-

fense will have only one opportunity to address you.

And

they will have to anticipate what the State will say on
rebuttal—after they have finished their closing statement,
I should say, then the State will have an opportunity to
make the final rebuttal closing statement.
Then the matter will be submitted to you to
deliberate on.

I should advise you that if you wish to, you

may take notes on this particular case.

And when you take

notes, do not share those notes with anyone else until you
get into the jury room.

And keep those notes confidential

all during the course of the trial until you go out to
deliberate.

Okay.

You may proceed.

MR. JONES:

Members of the jury, at the beginning

of every trial, the Court always allows each party, both the
prosecution and defense a chance to make what is called an
opening statement.
As Judge Uno told you, the comments of attorneys
13

[OPENING STATEMENT OF PROSECUTOR]

1

during an opening statement, of c o u r s e , are not evidence.

2

E v i d e n c e comes from the witnesses w h o are called to testify,

3

or it m a y come in the form of any exhibits that are received

4

in e v i d e n c e .

5

And the purpose of an opening statement is simply

6

to g i v e you an idea of w h a t this case is all about, and to

7

e x p l a i n to you w h a t we anticipate the testimony will b e .

8

y o u k n o w , this is a case involving burglary and theft.

9

is someone breaking into someone else's home and taking

That

10

p r o p e r t y that doesn't belong to them.

11

happened just over a year ago or just under a year a g o —

12

excuse m e — i n September of 1 9 8 7 .

13

this diagram of the area that's in q u e s t i o n .

14

As

This particular case

And we will be offering

The diagram essentially involves w h a t is called

15

Emery Street and Illinois Avenue h e r e .

W h a t you have is a

16

m a n named Ted John and his wife were living in this home at

17

1162 Emery Street.

18

m o r n i n g the 25th of September, and had been gone for a

19

couple of d a y s .

20

up the home.

2i

W h e n they came back on Sunday a f t e r n o o n , sometime between

They had left o n , I think it w a s , Friday

And of course w h e n they left, they locked

Nothing w a s missing, nothing had been taken.

22 I 4:00 and 6:00, they noticed there w a s a notice on the d o o r ,
23
24

essentially saying that the police had been there.
And about the same time, one of the neighbors came

25 I over and in essence told M r . John t h a t , hey, somebody has
14

1

broken into your house.

2

Well, Mr. John, of course, started to do an inven-

3

tory inside the home.

And essentially what he discovered

4

missing was his stereo system.

5

tuner and cassette

6

at, oh, somewhere between seven and $900.

7

discovered that of all things a vacuum cleaner had been

8

taken in this burglary.

player.

There was an amplifier, a

All of these items were valued
In addition they

9

Mr. John discovered that someone had removed one

10

of the screens on the window in the kitchen, and concluded

11

that that was probably the point of entry.

12

The police had already been there, had already

13

dusted the house for fingerprints, and had left.

14

course, contacted the police and gave them some information.

15

He, of

One of the things that the investigators dis-

16

covered in working on the c a s e — t h e police department—was

17

that across the street from Ted's house—they live at 1162,

18

and it is here 1173—that is a d u p l e x — a young couple named

19

Dean and Patricia Rains lived.

20

Dean and Patricia, and Mr. and Mrs. Rains said that on

21

Sunday morning at about eleven, 11:30, right in this area,

22

that they had observed a man coming down the street and

23

coming up on the porch here at the home that belonged to Ted

24

John.

25 I

And the officer talked to

Mrs. Rains told the officers that she knew who
15

1

that man was.

It was this defendant, Andrew Quintana.

2

said that he went up on the porch for a fev; minutes.

3

appeared to be looking through the windows.

She
Ke

Then he went

4

over by the* door, spent a couple of minutes at the door,

5

then he came down off the porch.

6

Well, Mr. and Mrs. Rains watched the defendant.

7

He came down off the porch and he came back up to the

8

corner.

9

parked there a small 1983 Mazda pickup.

Near the corner of Emery and Illinois, he had
And they said that

10

he got into the pickup and then he backed across the street,

11

through the intersection of Illinois and Emery, made a

12

right-hand turn, which would be sending him westbound, and

13

parked the car down in this vicinity.

14

the diagram.

15

Down at the end of

Mr. Rains, of course, was curious to know what he

16

was doing.

17

so what happened is Mr. Rains got into his vehicle and drove

18

up to the corner and came this same way, westbound along

19

Illinois.

20

imately here.

21

He said there was something just not right, and

Ke said that he noticed the pickup parked approx-

Now, this area on the diagram is an alleyway.

22

is not a very biq alley.

23

down it.

24

in the alleyway.

25

It

He couldn't drive a car or truck

There was a lot of weeds and debris and everything

Mr. Rains came down, made a U-turn and parked on
16

1

the o t h e r side of the Illinois S t r e e t , r i g h t next to that

2

alley.

3

d i d n ' t k n o w exactly where the defendant had g o n e , but

4

e s s e n t i a l l y he said he saw him come o u t .

5
6

And he said that the d e f e n d a n t was out of sight.

M R . BROWN:
Your Honor.

7

Excuse me.

I o b j e c t to that a r g u m e n t ,

May we approach the bench?

THE COURT:

8

Yes.
(Conference a t the bench.)

9 I
10

M R . BROWN:

Thank you.

MR. JONES:

By the w a y , M r . R a i n s , as I m e n t i o n e d ,

11

is sitting here in his v e h i c l e , and he sees this m a n come

12

o u t in the area here on the diagram, w h i c h is almost a d j a -

13

c e n t to where Ted John l i v e s .

14

came o u t , he appeared to be wearing some kind of a baggy

15

s h i r t , something like a large T-shirt.

16

something up underneath that T-shirt.

17

ly w h e n he saw the suspect, he kind of hesitated for a

18

m i n u t e , a l m o s t as if he was going to turn and go the other

19

way.

20
2i

He

And he said that when the man

Appeared there was
He said that initial-

Then he turned around and came back down the alleyway.
He walked right in front of M r . Rains and w e n t

over and got into something inside that 1983 Mazda pickup

22 I and took o f f .
23

W e l l , M r . Rains went back to his w i f e , told her to

24 I call the p o l i c e , and then he went over to Ted John's house
25 I and discovered that the back door w a s opened and v/ent in and
17

1

appeared someone had been in there, inside the house.

2

waited and the police eventually arrived.

3

He

One of the things that Mr. Rains was able to do

4

was to jot down a license plate number for this 1983 pickup

5

truck.

6

police department.

He wrote that down and gave that information to the

7

Later that same afternoon, about 3:00, there was

8

an Officer Robinson who was on duty, and had received some

9

of the information concerning this burglary, which had been

10

reported about 11:30 or 12:00.

11

vehicle matching the description of the one which had been

12

reported, a maroon 1983 Mazda pickup.

13

Officer Robinson observed a

He stopped the vehicle.

The person who was

14

driving the vehicle was Andrew Quintana.

15

else in the vehicle.

16

There was no one

He conducted a search and found nothing in the

17

vehicle as far as the property which had been reported

18

missing.

19

Members of the jury, that in essence is the case.

20

The property was not recovered.

It never has been re-

21

covered.

22

this case tells you that there is only one person who is

23

actually resoonsible for the break-in, the burglary, the

24

theft of the property, and that is this defendant, Andrew

25

Quintana.

But I submit to you that the evidence you have in

18

1

Thank you.

2

MR. BROWN:

Before I give my statement, Your

3

Honor, I think we should deal with what we talked about on

4

the side bar.

5

THE COURT:

All right.

6

jury step out one moment.

7

wishes to make at this time.

8

If we can just have the

There is a motion that defense

(Jury outside the courtroom.)

9

MR. BROWN:

Your Honor, at this time, pursuant to

10

our conversation at the side bar, the Court indicated that

11

I could make a motion at this time and have the same force

12

and effect as if it had been made when we approached the

13

bench; is that correct?

14

THE COURT:

Yes.

15

MR. BROWN:

And the reason I ask to approach the

16

bench at that time, Your Honor, is because Mr. Jones, in hi

17

opening statement, indicated—told the jury that Mr. Rains

18

saw the defendant when he made reference to the defendant

19

coming out of the alley.

20

defendant.

21

prior motion of the defendant, has suppressed the witness

22

identification of Mr. Rains, and has signed an order that

23

Mr. Rains cannot make any identification of the defendant.

24

Can't make an eyewitness identification of the defendant.

25

Ke said that Mr. Rains saw the

Now, that's critical because the Court, on a

Mr. Jones's statement to the jury certainly,
19

ADDENDUM D

Thank you,
MR. BROWN:

Before I give my statement, Your

Honor, I think we should deal with what we talked about on
the side bar.
THE COURT:

All right.

jury step out one moment.

If we can just have the

There is a motion that defense

wishes to make at this time.
(Jury outside the courtroom.)
MR. BROWN:

Your Honor, at this time, pursuant to

our conversation at the side bar, the Court indicated that
I could make a motion at this time and have the same force
and effect as if it had been made when we approached the
bench; is that correct?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. BROWN:

And the reason I ask to approach the

bench at that time, Your Honor, is because Mr. Jones, in his
opening statement, indicated—told the jury that Mr. Rains
saw the defendant when he made reference to the defendant
coming out of the alley.
defendant.

Ke said that Mr. Rains saw the

Now, that's critical because the Court, on a

prior motion of the defendant, has suppressed the witness
identification of Mr. Rains, and has signed an order that
Mr. Rains cannot make any identification of the defendant.
Can't make an eyewitness identification of the defendant.
Mr. Jones's statement to the jury certainly,
19

fMTSTRTAL MOTTONl

1

although it is not the testimony of Mr. Rains at this time,

2

he hasn't testified yet, but he has told the jury that Mr.

3

Rains saw the defendant coming out of the alleyway.

4

is no two ways about it.

5

right now that Mr. Rains saw the defendant.

6

move for a mistrial on that basis.

7

MR. JONES:

There

Planted in the minds of the jury
And I would

Well, Your Honor, I think the Court is

8

clearly aware first of all the proposition that what is said

9

in the opening statement is not evidence, and the jury, I

10

think, clearly understands all we are doing is outlining the

11

case in what we anticipate the evidence to be.

12

The next question becomes is whether this comment

13

is so prejudicial that somehow it warrants justifying a mis-

14

trial.

15

see how the comments to the jury about what we anticipate

16

the testimony will be, even in light of the Court's ruling

17

that we not make a positive identification, has so tainted

18

or prejudiced the case that it justifies starting over, or

19

at least granting some kind of mistrial.

20

I just, by any stretch of the imagination, I don't

Clearly the evidence is going to come out that Mr.

21

Rains followed somebody, and that there was somebody on the

22

front porch.

23

whether or not that was the defendant.

24

that the comments or statements made in the opening state-

25

ment constitute mistrial.

I

The ultimate issue in this case is, of course,
And I just don't see

20

1

MR. BROUN:

When the question is identification,

2

how prejudiced can a defendant get when Mr. Jones tells the

3

jury that Mr. Rains saw the defendant.

4

more bluntly than that.

5 1

The question is identification.

Mr. Quintana says he wasn't there.

6

body.

7

with this all the way through.

They saw some-

There was definitely—we are going to have a problem

8 J grant a mistrial.
9

I can't say it any

I would ask the Court to

We will start this thing up again first

thing in the morning.

But I don't know how much more pre-

10

judiced a defendant can get by the prosecutor telling the

11

jury that Mr. Rains saw the defendant.

12

defendant in here, and that is Mr. Quintana.

13

right here.

14

There is only one
He is seated

I renew my motion.

THE COURT:

Based on what has been argued, the

15

Court is going to deny the motion.

Court will either make a

16

curative instruction, but I believe the Court has already

17

told the jurors that the only evidence that they are to con-

18 1 sider is the evidence that's heard from the witness stand.
19

So as the evidence comes out in arguments that are made, you

20

will have t o — t h a t will have to be tied in, and I don't

21

think it can be tied in as far as the evidence is concerned.

22

So the motion will be denied.

23

(Jury returns to the courtroom.)

24

MR. BROWN:

May I proceed, Your Honor?

25

THE COURT:

You may do so.
21

ADDENDUM E

1

THE COURT:

2
3

Q

Sustained.

(By M r . Jones)

Can you give the jury an idea of

how far it is from your driveway across to Ted John's house?

4

A

Maybe a hundred feet away.

5

Q

And is there anything at all that blocks your view

6

or your vision from where you stood, as you unloaded the

7

car, to the Ted John's home?

8 I

A

No.

9

Q

You said that the man you saw is who?

10

A

Andy Quintana.

it

Q

And do you recognize him here in court?

12

A

I do.

13

Q

Just for the record, what is he wearing today?

14

A

W h a t is he wearing today?

15

Q

How is he dressed?

16

A

He is wearing a sweater and gray jeans.

17

Q

And where is he seated?

18

A

Right there in the front at this table.

19
20

MR. JONES:

identification of the defendant?

21
22
23

Your Honor, may the record reflect

THE COURT:
0

Y e s , it may do so.

(By Mr. Jones)

M r s . Rains, do vou_Jcngw__ths__cl&fanr

dan^

24

A

I don't know the defendant.

25

Q

Have you seen him before?

I know of him.

61
[DIRECT-EXAMINATION OF M R S . RAINS]

1

A

I have.

2

Q

Did you recognize him on that day when you saw him]

3

at the front of the house?

4

A

I did,

5

Q

Do you recall how he was dressed that day?

6

A

He had on a T-shirt.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

I couldn't swear to the

color of the shirt, and Bermuda shorts.
Q

Now, when you say Bermuda shorts, can you describe

those for me; what they look like?
A

Just all colors.

I remember bright and colorful

and just above the knee.
Q

Anything else that you recall about how he was

dressed?

14

A

No.

15

Q

What did you do, then, after you saw him on the

16

porch as you unloaded the groceries?

17

A

I just went straight into the house.

18

Q

And did you see him again after you went into the

19

house?

20

A

Yeah, because I walked over to the window, because

21

my husband was looking out the window.

22

see what he was looking at.

So I walked over to

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

And then I seen him walk off of the porch and over

25

to his truck.

62
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1

correct?

2

A

Uh-huh.

3

Q

And no one was in the pickup when you first saw

4

the pickup?

5

A

No one was in it.

6

Q

And you first saw an individual on the neighbors'

7

porch across the street when you pulled into your driveway?

8

A

Yeah.

9

Q

Is that correct?

10

A

N o , I seen it when I turned the corner.

As I

11

turned the corner, I seen the truck and I glanced up and he

12

was on the porch.

13
14

Q

Were you paying any particular attention to it at

that point; is that true?

15

A

(No response.)

16

Q

Was there any reason that you were paying any

17
18
19
20
21

attention to it at that point?
A

I was paying attention more to the person than the

vehicle because I recognized him.
Q

Vlhen you first saw the person/ did you say to

yourself, well, that f s Andrew Quintana?

22

A

I did.

23

Q

You said that to yourself?

24

A

Yeah.

25

I said, "That's Andy," and I thought he was

stranded.

rnpncq-FYAMTNATTON OF MRS. RAINS]

1 I

Q

Y o u never m e t A n d y ?

2 I

A

I have never m e t him.

3
4

I d o n ' t p e r s o n a l l y know-

I know of him.
Q

Let me just ask you the questions.

You can r e -

5

spond to them.

6

you had seen the person that you thought was Andy Quintana?

7 J

When was the last time f prior to that, that

A^

Oh, maybe a few days ago, because I drive up and

Q

Two or three days ago?

10

A

Two or three days ago.

11

Q

Where was this place that you thought you saw Andy

8
9 I

12

Quintana two or three days ago?

13

A

On 9th West.

14

Q

9th West?

15

A

9th West, and 8 th South, because I uses that street!

16

a lot.

17

Q

Were you alone at that time?

18

A

Uh-huh.

19

I was h e a d e d - -probably I was headed back I

t o work,

20

Q

W e r e y o u just p a s s i n g h i m o n the street?,

21

A

Yeah.

Q

But never met him?

22

OHB»

23

A
«MBfc

24

Q

25

A

••••••••••••••••••••••••••fe

T

never met him.
€••••••••••••••••••••••1

I just

know o f h i m .

€••••••••••••••••••••••••••*

D i d someone e l s e give y o u h i s name?
No.
69

Q

No one gave you his name, but you knew his name

was Andy Quintana?
^••••••••••••••••••••••••^

A

Because I know of him.

Q

Who gave you his name?

A

(No response.)

Q

Your answer is no?

A

No.

Q

Have you been to his house?

Do you know somebody?

A

JJever.

Q

Has he been to your house?

A

I think he has with maybe my sister.

Q

Do you know for sure that he has been to your

A

No.

Q

Now, when you parked in your driveway—now, your

driveway—could you designate that on the chart?
A

My driveway?

Q

Where your driveway is.

A

My driveway is right here.

Q

And that would be on the north side of the house?

A

Uh-huh.

Q

And while you were getting out of the car with

your groceries, you looked across the street and you sav/
this man knocking on the door?
A

Uh-huh.
70

ADDENDUM F

INSTRUCTION NO.
Possession

of

recently

/ * ?

stolen

property,

if

not

satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in the light of
the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence of the case,
that the person in possession knew the property had been stolen.
Thus

if

you

find

from

the

evidence

and

beyond

a

reasonable doubt, that the defendant was in possession of stolen
property, that such possession was not too remote in point of time
from the theft, and the defendant made no satisfactory explanation
of such possession, then you may infer from those facts that the
defendant committed the theft.
You may use the same inference, if you find it justified
by

the

evidence,

to

connect

the

possessor

of

recently

stolen

property with the offense of burglary.

0'}(K

